


1 Ursula Schanne, *pro se*
 2 Gerard H Moore, *pro se*
 3 16503 Reichel Rd SE
 4 Rainier, Washington 98576
 5 (360) 446-2121
 6 xercies@aol.com



8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
 9 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON STATE

10 Ursula Schanne, *pro se*
 Ursula Schanne, *pro se*

Plaintiff,

CV 10-5753 BHS

Case #

ORIGINAL PETITION

vs.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC

Defendant

Date: October 14th 2010

11

12 Comes now Ursula Schanne Gerard H Moore , hereinafter referred to as "Petitioner," and
 13 moves the court for relief as herein requested:

14

PARTIES

15 Petitioner is Ursula Schanne Gerard H Moore , 16503 Reichel Rd SE Rainier WA 98576.
 16 Currently Known Defendant(s) are/is: Nationstar Mortgage LLC , 350 Highland Dr , TX
 17 75067, by and through its attorney .

18

STATEMENT OF CAUSE

19 Petitioner, entered into a consumer contract for the refinance of a primary residence located at
 20 16503 Reichel Rd SE Rainier WA 98576, hereinafter referred to as the "property."

21 Defendants, acting in concert and collusion with others, induced Petitioner to enter into a
 22 predatory loan agreement with Defendant.

23 Defendants committed numerous acts of fraud against Petitioner in furtherance of a carefully
 24 crafted scheme intended to defraud Petitioner.



ORIGINAL PETITION

1 of 25

25 Defendants failed to make proper notices to Petitioner that would have given Petitioner warning
26 of the types of tactics used by Defendants to defraud Petitioner.

27 Defendants charged false fees to Petitioner at settlement.

28 Defendants used the above referenced false fees to compensate agents of Petitioner in order to
29 induce said agents to breach their fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

30 Defendant's attorney caused to be initiated collection procedures, knowing said collection
31 procedures in the instant action were frivolous as lender is estopped from collection procedures,
32 under authority of Uniform Commercial Code 3-501, subsequent to the request by Petitioner for
33 the production of the original promissory note alleged to create a debt.

34 **IN BRIEF**

35 *(Non-factual Statement of Posture and Position)*

36 It is not the intent of Petitioner to indict the entire industry. It is just that Plaintiff will be
37 making a number of allegations that, outside the context of the current condition of the real
38 estate industry, may seem somewhat outrageous and counter-intuitive.

39 When Petitioner accuses ordinary individuals of acting in concert and collusion with an
40 ongoing criminal conspiracy, it tends to trigger an incredulous response as it is
41 unreasonable to consider that all Agents, loan agents, appraisers, and other ordinary
42 people, just doing what they have been trained to do, are out to swindle the poor
43 unsuspecting borrower.

44 The facts Petitioner is prepared to prove are that Petitioner has been harmed by fraud
45 committed by people acting in concert and collusion, one with the other. Petitioner has no
46 reason to believe that the Agent, loan officer, appraiser, and others were consciously aware
47 that what they were doing was part of an ongoing criminal conspiracy, only that it was,
48 and they, at the very least, kept themselves negligently uninformed of the wrongs they
49 were perpetrating. Petitioner maintains the real culprit is the system itself, including the
50 courts, for failure to strictly enforce the consumer protection laws.

51 **CAREFULLY CRAFTED CRIMINAL CONNIVANCE**

52 *(General State of the Real Estate Industry)*

53 ***THE BEST OF INTENTIONS***

54 Prior to the 1980's and 1990's ample government protections were in place to protect
 55 consumers and the lending industry from precisely the disaster we now experience.
 56 During President Clinton's administration, under the guise of making housing available to
 57 the poor, primary protections were relaxed which had the effect of releasing the
 58 unscrupulous on the unwary.

59 Prior to deregulation in the 1980's, lenders created loans for which they held and assumed
 60 the risk. Consequently, Americans were engaged in safe and stable home mortgages.
 61 With the protections removed, the unscrupulous lenders swooped in and, instead of
 62 making loans available to the poor, used the opportunity to convince the unsophisticated
 63 American public to do something that had been traditionally taboo; home buyers were
 64 convinced to speculate with their homes, their most important investment.

65 Nationstar Mortgage LLC , Ameriquest, Countrywide, and many others swooped in and
 66 convinced Americans to sell their homes, get out of their safe mortgage agreements, and
 67 speculate with the equity they had gained by purchasing homes they could not afford.
 68 Lenders created loans intended to fail as, under the newly crafted system, the Lender
 69 profited more from a mortgage default than from a stable loan.

70 Companies cropped up who called themselves banks when, in fact, they were only either
 71 subsidiaries of banks, or unaffiliated companies that were operated for the purpose of
 72 creating and selling promissory notes. As will be demonstrated, these companies then
 73 profited from the failure of the underlying loans.

74 ***HOW IT WORKS***

75 Briefly, how it works is this, the Lender would secure a large loan from a large bank,
 76 convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages and then sell the promise to pay to an
 77 investor.

78 People would set up mortgage companies by securing a large loan from one of the major
 79 banks, then convert that loan into 20 and 30 year mortgages. In order to accomplish this
 80 an Agent would contract with a seller to find a buyer, bring both seller and buyer to a
 81 lender who would secure the title from the seller using the borrowed bank funds for that
 82

83 The lender then creates a 20 or 30 year mortgage with money the lender must repay within
84 6 months. As soon as the closing is consummated, the promissory note is sold to an
85 investor pool.

86 Using the instant case as an example, a 322,050.00 note at 7.2730% interest over 30 years
87 will produce \$281,977.22 The lender can then offer to the investor the security instrument
88 (promissory note) at say 50% of it's future value. The investor will, over the life of the
89 note, less approximately 3.00% servicing fees, realize \$389,473.35 . The lender can then
90 pay back the bank and retain a handsome profit in the amount of \$91,514.48. The lender,
91 however, is not done with the deal.

92 The lender signed over the promissory note to the investor at the time of the trade, but did
93 not sign over the lien document (mortgage or deed of trust). The State of Kansas Supreme
94 Court addressed this issue and stated that such a transaction was certainly legal. However,
95 it created a fatal flaw as the holder of the lien document, at time of sale of the security
96 instrument, received consideration in excess of the lien amount. Since the lien holder
97 received consideration, he could not be harmed. Therefore the lien became an
98 unenforceable document.

99 This begs the question: if keeping the lien would render it void, why would the lender not
100 simply transfer the lien with the promissory note? The reason is because the lender will
101 hold the lien for three years, file an Internal Revenue Service Form 1099a, claim the full
102 amount of the lien as abandoned funds, and deduct the full amount from the lender's tax
103 liability. The lender, by this maneuver, gets consideration a second time. And still the
104 lender is not done profiting from the deal.

105 After sale of the promissory note, the lender remains as the servicer for the investor. The
106 lender will receive 3% of each payment the lender collects and renders to the investor
107 pool. However, if the payment is late, the lender is allowed to assess an extra 5% and keep
108 that amount. Also, if the loan defaults, the lender stands to gain thousands for handling the
109 foreclosure.

110 The lender stands to profit more from a note that is overly expensive, than from a good
111 stable loan. And where, you may ask, does all this profit come from? It comes from the
112 equity the borrower had built up in the home. And still the lender is not finished profiting
113 from the deal.

114 Another nail was driven in the American financial coffin when on the last day Congress
115 was in session in 2000 when restrictions that had been in place since the economic
116 collapse of 1907 were removed. Until 1907 investors were allowed to bet on stocks
117 without actually buying them. This unbridled speculation led directly to an economic
118 collapse. As a result the legislature banned the practice, until the year 2000. In 2000 the
119 unscrupulous lenders got their way on the last day of the congressional session. Congress
120 removed the restriction banning derivatives and again allowed the practice, this time
121 taking only 8 years to crash the stock market. This practice allowed the lender to profit
122 further from the loan by betting on the failure of the security instrument he had just sold to
123 the unwary investor, thus furthering the purpose of the lender to profit from both the
124 borrower (consumer) and the investor.

125 The failure of so many loans recently resulted in a seven hundred and fifty billion dollar
126 bailout at the expense of the taxpayer. The unsuspecting consumer was lulled into
127 accepting the pronouncements of the lenders, appraisers, underwriters, and trustees as all
128 were acting under the guise of government regulation and, therefore, the borrower had
129 reason to expect good and fair dealings from all. Unfortunately, the regulations in place to
130 protect the consumer from just this kind of abuse were simply being ignored.

131 The loan origination fee from the HUD1 settlement statement is the finder's fee paid for
132 the referral of the client to the lender by a person acting as an agent for the borrower.
133 Hereinafter, the person or entity who receives any portion of the yield spread premium, or
134 a commission of any kind consequent to securing the loan agreement through from the
135 borrower will be referred to as "Agent." The fee, authorized by the consumer protection
136 law is restricted to 1% of the principal of the note. It was intended that the Agent, when
137 seeking out a lender for the borrower, would seek the best deal for his client rather than
138 who would pay him the most. That was the intent, but not the reality. The reality is that
139 Agents never come away from the table with less than 2% or 3% of the principal. This is
140 accomplished by undisclosed fees to the Agent in order to induce the Agent to breach his
141 fiduciary duty to the borrower and convince the borrower to accept a more expensive loan
142 product than the borrower qualifies for. This will generate more profits for the lender and,
143 consequently, for the Agent.

144 It is a common practice for lenders to coerce appraisers to give a higher appraisal than is
145 the fair market price. This allows the lender to increase the cost of the loan product and
146 give the impression that the borrower is justified in making the purchase.

147 The lender then charges the borrower an underwriting fee in order to convince the
148 borrower that someone with knowledge has gone over the conditions of the note and
149 certified that they meet all legal criteria. The trustee, at closing, participates actively in the
150 deception of the borrower by placing undue stress on the borrower to sign the large stack
151 of paperwork without reading it. The trustee is, after all, to be trusted and has been paid to
152 insure the transaction. This trust is systematically violated for the purpose of taking unfair
153 advantage of the borrower. The entire loan process is a carefully crafted contrive
154 connivance designed and intended to induce the unsophisticated borrower into accepting a
155 loan product that is beyond the borrowers means to repay. With all this, it should be a
156 surprise to no one that this country is having a real estate crisis.

157 **PETITIONER WILL PROVE THE FOLLOWING**

158 Petitioner is prepared to prove, by a preponderance of evidence that:

- 159 • Lender has no legal standing to bring collection or foreclosure claims against the
160 property;
- 161 • Lender is not a real party in interest in any contract which can claim a collateral
162 interest in the property;
- 163 • even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had standing to enforce
164 against Petitioner, no valid lien exists which would give Lender a claim against the
165 property;
- 166 • even if Lender were to prove up a contract to which Lender had standing to enforce
167 against Petitioner, said contract was fraudulent in its creation as endorsement was
168 secured by acts of negligence, common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, fraud in
169 the inducement, fraud in the execution, usury, and breaches of contractual and
170 fiduciary obligations by Mortgagee or "Trustee" on the Deed of Trust, "Mortgage
171 Agents," "Loan Originators," "Loan Seller," "Mortgage Aggregator," "Trustee of
172 Pooled Assets," "Trustee or officers of Structured Investment Vehicle,"
173 "Investment Banker," "Trustee of Special Purpose Vehicle/Issuer of Certificates of
174 'Asset-Backed Certificates,'" "Seller of 'Asset-Backed' Certificates (shares or
175 bonds)," "Special Servicer" and Trustee, respectively, of certain mortgage loans
176 pooled together in a trust fund;

- 177 • Defendants have concocted a carefully crafted connivance wherein Lender
178 conspired with Agents, et al, to strip Petitioner of Petitioner's equity in the property
179 by inducing Plaintiff to enter into a predatory loan inflated loan product;
- 180 • Lender received unjust enrichment in the amount of 5% of each payment made late
181 to Lender while Lender and Lender's assigns acted as servicer of the note;
- 182 • Lender and Lender's assigns, who acted as servicer in place of Lender, profited by
183 handling the foreclosure process on a contract Lender designed to have a high
184 probability of default;
- 185 • Lender intended to defraud Investor by converting the promissory note into a
186 security instrument and selling same to Investor;
- 187 • Lender intended to defraud Investor and the taxpayers of the United States by
188 withholding the lien document from the sale of the promissory note in order that
189 Lender could then hold the lien for three years, then prepare and file Internal
190 Revenue Form 1099a and falsely claim the full lien amount as abandoned funds
191 and deduct same from Lender's income tax obligation;
- 192 • Lender defrauded backers of derivatives by betting on the failure of the promissory
193 note the lender designed to default;
- 194 • participant Defendants, et al, in the securitization scheme described herein have
195 devised business plans to reap millions of dollars in profits at the expense of
196 Petitioner and others similarly situated.

197 **PETITIONER SEEKS REMEDY**

198 In addition to seeking compensatory, consequential and other damages, Petitioner seeks
199 declaratory relief as to what (if any) party, entity or individual or group thereof is the
200 owner of the promissory note executed at the time of the loan closing, and whether the
201 Deed of Trust (Mortgage) secures any obligation of the Petitioner, and a Mandatory
202 Injunction requiring re-conveyance of the subject property to the Petitioner or, in the
203 alternative a Final Judgment granting Petitioner Quiet Title in the subject property.

204 **PETITIONER HAS BEEN HARMED**

205 Petitioner has suffered significant harm and detriment as a result of the actions of Defendants.

206 Such harm and detriment includes economic and non-economic damages, and injuries to
207 Petitioner's mental and emotional health and strength, all to be shown according to proof at trial.

208 In addition, Petitioner will suffer grievous and irreparable further harm and detriment unless the
209 equitable relief requested herein is granted.

210 **STATEMENT OF CLAIM**

211 ***DEFENDANTS LACK STANDING***

212 **No evidence of Contractual Obligation**

213 Defendants claim a controversy based on a contractual violation by Petitioner but have failed to
214 produce said contract. Even if Defendants produced evidence of the existence of said contract in
215 the form of an allegedly accurate photocopy of said document, a copy is only hearsay evidence
216 that a contract actually existed at one point in time. A copy, considering the present state of
217 technology, could be easily altered. As Lender only created one original and that original was
218 left in the custody of Lender, it was imperative that Lender protect said instrument.

219 In as much as the Lender is required to present the original on demand of Petitioner, there can be
220 no presumption of regularity when the original is not so produced. In as much as Lender has
221 refused Petitioner's request of the chain of custody of the security instrument in question by
222 refusing to identify all current and past real parties in interest, there is no way to follow said
223 chain of custody to insure, by verified testimony, that no alterations to the original provisions in
224 the contract have been made. Therefore, the alleged copy of the original is only hearsay
225 evidence that an original document at one time existed. Petitioner maintains that, absent
226 production of admissible evidence of a contractual obligation on the part of Petitioner,
227 Defendants are without standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.

228 **No Proper Evidence of Agency**

229 Defendants claim agency to represent the principal in a contractual agreement involving
230 Petitioner, however, Defendants have failed to provide any evidence of said agency other than a
231 pronouncement that agency has been assigned by some person, the true identity and capacity of
232 whom has not been established. Defendants can hardly claim to be agents of a principal then
233 refuse to identify said principal. All claims of agency are made from the mouth of the agent with
234 no attempt to provide admissible evidence from the principal.

235 Absent proof of agency, Defendants lack standing to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the
236 court.

237 **Special Purpose Vehicle**

238 Since the entity now claiming agency to represent the holder of the security instrument is not the
239 original lender, Petitioner has reason to believe that the promissory note, upon consummation of
240 the contract, was converted to a security and sold into a special purpose vehicle and now resides
241 in a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) as defined by the Internal Revenue
242 Code and as such, cannot be removed from the REMIC as such would be a prohibited
243 transaction. If the mortgage was part of a special purpose vehicle and was removed on
244 consideration of foreclosure, the real party in interest would necessarily be the trustee of the
245 special purpose vehicle. Nothing in the pleadings of Defendants indicates the existence of a
246 special purpose vehicle, and the lack of a proper chain of custody documentation gives Petitioner
247 cause to believe defendant is not the proper agent of the real party in interest.

248 ***CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY AND THEFT***

249 Defendants, by and through Defendant's Agents, conspired with other Defendants, et al, toward
250 a criminal conspiracy to defraud Petitioner. Said conspiracy but are not limited to acts of
251 negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, fraud by non-disclosure, and tortuous
252 acts of conspiracy and theft, to include but not limited to, the assessment of improper fees to
253 Petitioner by Lender, which were then used to fund the improper payment of commission fees to
254 Agent in order to induce Agent to violate Agent's fiduciary duty to Petitioner.

255 ***AGENT PRACTICED UP-SELLING***

256 By and through the above alleged conspiracy, Agent practiced up-selling to Petitioner. In so
257 doing, Agent violated the trust relationship actively cultivated by Agent and supported by fact
258 that Agent was licensed by the state. Agent further defrauded Petitioner by failing to disclose
259 Agent's conspiratorial relationship to Lender, Agent violated Agent's fiduciary duty to
260 Petitioner and the duty to provide fair and honest services, through a series of carefully crafted
261 connivances, wherein Agent proactively made knowingly false and misleading statements of
262 alleged fact to Petitioner, and by giving partial disclosure of facts intended to directly mislead
263 Petitioner for the purpose of inducing Petitioner to make decisions concerning the acceptance of
264 a loan product offered by the Lender. Said loan product was more expensive than Petitioner

265 could legally afford. Agent acted with full knowledge that Petitioner would have made a
266 different decision had Agent given complete disclosure.

267 ***FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT***

268 Lender maliciously induced Petitioner to accept a loan product, Lender knew, or should have
269 known, Petitioner could not afford in order to unjustly enrich Lender.

270 ***EXTRA PROFIT ON SALE OF PREDATORY LOAN PRODUCT***

271 Said more expensive loan product was calculated to produce a higher return when sold as a
272 security to an investor who was already waiting to purchase the loan as soon as it could be
273 consummated.

274 ***Extra Commission for Late Payments***

275 Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce Petitioner to enter into a loan agreement
276 that Lender intended Petitioner would have difficulty paying. The industry standard payment to
277 the servicer for servicing a mortgage note is 3% of the amount collected. However, if the
278 borrower is late on payments, a 5% late fee is added and this fee is retained by the servicer.
279 Thereby, the Lender stands to receive more than double the regular commission on collections if
280 the borrower pays late.

281 ***Extra Income for Handling Foreclosure***

282 Lender acted with deliberate malice in order to induce petitioner to enter into a loan agreement
283 on which Lender intended petitioner to default. In case of default, the Lender, acting as servicer,
284 receives considerable funds for handling and executing the foreclosure process.

285 ***Credit Default Swap Gambling***

286 Lender, after deliberately creating a loan intended to default is now in a position to bet on credit
287 default swap, commonly referred to as a derivative as addressed more fully below. Since Lender
288 designed the loan to fail, betting on said failure is essentially a sure thing.

289 ***LENDER ATTEMPTING TO FRAUDULENTLY COLLECT ON VOID LIEN***

290 Lender sold the security instrument after closing and received consideration in an amount in
291 excess of the lien held by Lender. Since Lender retained the lien document upon the sale of the
ORIGINAL PETITION

292 security instrument, Lender separated the lien from said security instrument, creating a fatal and
293 irreparable flaw.

294 When Lender received consideration while still holding the lien and said consideration was in
295 excess of the amount of the lien, Lender was in a position such that he could not be harmed and
296 could not gain standing to enforce the lien. The lien was, thereby, rendered void.

297 Since the separation of the lien from the security instrument creates such a considerable concern,
298 said separation certainly begs a question: "Why would the Lender retain the lien when selling the
299 security instrument?"

300 When you follow the money the answer is clear. The Lender will hold the lien for three years,
301 then file an IRS Form 1099a and claim the full amount of the lien as abandoned funds and deduct
302 the full amount from Lender's tax liability, thereby, receiving consideration a second time.

303 Later, in the expected eventuality of default by petitioner, Lender then claimed to transfer the
304 lien to the holder of the security, however, the lien once satisfied, does not gain authority just
305 because the holder, after receiving consideration, decides to transfer it to someone else.

306 ***LENDER PROFIT BY CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP DERIVATIVES***

307 Lender further stood to profit by credit default swaps in the derivatives market, by way of inside
308 information that Lender had as a result of creating the faulty loans sure to default. Lender was
309 then free to invest on the bet that said loan would default and stood to receive unjust enrichment
310 a third time. This credit default swap derivative market scheme is almost totally responsible for
311 the stock market disaster we now experience as it was responsible for the stock market crash in
312 1907.

313 ***LENDER CHARGED FALSE FEES***

314 Lender charged fees to Petitioner that were in violation of the limitations imposed by the Real
315 Estate Settlement Procedures Act as said fees were simply contrived and not paid to a third party
316 vendor.

317 Lender charged other fees that were a normal part of doing business and should have been
318 included in the finance charge.

319 Below is a listing of the fees charged at settlement. Neither at settlement, nor at any other time
 320 did Lender or Trustee provide documentation to show that the fees herein listed were valid,
 321 necessary, reasonable, and proper to charge Petitioner.

803	Appraisal Fee	\$450.00
809	Broker Origination Fee	\$3,220.00
810	Processing Fee	\$500.00
811	Misc Fees	\$1,260.00
901	Interest)	\$1,605.84
902	Mortgage Insurance Premium	\$209.33
903	Hazard Insurance Premium	\$635.00
1001	Hazard Insurance	\$158.76
1002	Mortgage Insurance	\$209.33
1004	County Property Taxes	\$874.88
1101	Settlement fee	\$490.00
1109	Lenders coverage	\$437.00
1111	Courier/Wire Fee	\$25.00
1112	Email Doc Fee	\$25.00
1113	Misc Fees	\$79.89
1201	Recording Fee	\$100.00
1207	Misc Fees	\$45.00

322 Debtor is unable to determine whether or not the above fees are valid in accordance with the
 323 restrictions provided by the various consumer protection laws. Therefore, please provide; a
 324 complete billing from each vendor who provided the above listed services; the complete contact
 325 information for each vendor who provided a billed service; clearly stipulate as to the specific
 326 service performed; a showing that said service was necessary; a showing that the cost of said
 327 service is reasonable; a showing of why said service is not a regular cost of doing business that
 328 should rightly be included in the finance charge.

329 The above charges are hereby disputed and deemed unreasonable until such time as said charges
 330 have been demonstrated to be reasonable, necessary, and in accordance with the limitations and
 331 restrictions included in any and all laws, rules, and regulations intended to protect the consumer.

332 In the event lender fails to properly document the above charges, borrower will consider same as
 333 false charges. The effect of the above amounts that borrower would pay over the life of the note
 334 will be an overpayment of \$199,010.61 This amount will be reduced by the amount of items
 335 above when said items are fully documented.

336 **RESPA PENALTY**

337 From a cursory examination of the records, with the few available, the apparent RESPA
 338 violations are as follows: Good Faith Estimate not within limits, No HUD-1 Booklet, Truth In
 339 Lending Statement not within limits compared to Note, Truth in Lending Statement not timely
 ORIGINAL PETITION

340 presented, HUD-1 not presented at least one day before closing, No Holder Rule Notice in Note,
341 No 1st Payment Letter.

342 The closing documents included no signed and dated : Financial Privacy Act Disclosure; Equal
343 Credit Reporting Act Disclosure; notice of right to receive appraisal report; servicing disclosure
344 statement; borrower's Certification of Authorization; notice of credit score; RESPA servicing
345 disclosure letter; loan discount fee disclosure; business insurance company arrangement
346 disclosure; notice of right to rescind.

347 The courts have held that the borrower does not have to show harm to claim a violation of the
348 Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, as the Act was intended to insure strict compliance. And,
349 in as much as the courts are directed to assess a penalty of no less than two hundred dollars and
350 no more than two thousand, considering the large number enumerated here, it is reasonable to
351 consider that the court will assess the maximum amount for each violation.

352 Since the courts have held that the penalty for a violation of RESPA accrues at consummation of
353 the note, borrower has calculated that, the number of violations found in a cursory examination
354 of the note, if deducted from the principal, would result in an overpayment on the part of the
355 borrower, over the life of the note, of \$289,495.22.

356 If the violation penalty amounts for each of the unsupported fees listed above are included, the
357 amount by which the borrower would be defrauded is \$296,292.96

358 Adding in RESPA penalties for all the unsupported settlement fees along with the TILA/Note
359 variance, it appears that lender intended to defraud borrower in the amount of \$973,346.12

360 ***LENDER CONSPIRED WITH APPRAISER***

361 Lender, in furtherance of the above referenced conspiracy, conspired with appraiser for the
362 purpose of preparing an appraisal with a falsely stated price, in violation of appraiser's fiduciary
363 duty to Petitioner and appraiser's duty to provide fair and honest services, for the purpose of
364 inducing Petitioner to enter into a loan product that was fraudulent toward the interests of
365 Petitioner.

366 ***LENDER CONSPIRED WITH TRUSTEE***

367 Lender conspired with the trust Agent at closing to create a condition of stress for the specific
368 purpose of inducing Petitioner to sign documents without allowing time for Petitioner to read and
369 fully understand what was being signed.

370 The above referenced closing procedure was a carefully crafted connivance, designed and
371 intended to induce Petitioner, through shame and trickery, in violation of trustee's fiduciary duty
372 to Petitioner and the duty to provide fair and honest services, to sign documents that Petitioner
373 did not have opportunity to read and fully understand, thereby, denying Petitioner full disclosure
374 as required by various consumer protection statutes.

375 ***DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING AND OTHER UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES***

376 In the manner in which Defendants have carried on their business enterprises, they have engaged
377 in a variety of unfair and unlawful business practices prohibited by *15 USC Section 45 et seq.*
378 (Deceptive Practices Act).

379 Such conduct comprises a pattern of business activity within the meaning of such statutes, and
380 has directly and proximately caused Petitioner to suffer economic and non-economic harm and
381 detriment in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

382 ***EQUITABLE TOLLING FOR TILA AND RESPA***

383 The Limitations Period for Petitioners' Damages Claims under TILA and RESPA should be
384 Equitably Tolled due to the DEFENDANTS' Misrepresentations and Failure to Disclose.

385 Any claims for statutory and other money damages under the Truth in Lending Act (*15 U.S.C. §*
386 *1601, et. seq.*) and under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (*12 U.S.C. § 2601 et. seq.*)
387 are subject to a one-year limitations period; however, such claims are subject to the equitable
388 tolling doctrine. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the TILA limitations period in § 1640(e) as
389 subject to equitable tolling. In *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.1986), the court held
390 that given the remedial purpose of TILA, the limitations period should run from the date of
391 consummation of the transaction, but that "the doctrine of equitable tolling may, in appropriate
392 circumstances, suspend the limitations period until the borrower discovers or has reasonable
393 opportunity to discover the fraud or nondisclosures that form the basis of the TILA action." *King*
394 *v. California*, 784 F.2d 910, 915 9th Cir. 1986).

395 Likewise, while the Ninth Circuit has not taken up the question whether *12 U.S.C. § 2614*, the
396 anti-kickback provision of RESPA, is subject to equitable tolling, other Courts have, and hold
397 that such limitations period may be equitably tolled. The Court of Appeals for the District of
398 Columbia held that § 2614 imposes a strictly jurisdictional limitation, *Hardin v. City Title &*

399 *Escrow Co.*, 797 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (D.C. Cir. 1986), while the Seventh Circuit came to the
 400 opposite conclusion. *Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Dearborn Title Corp.*, 118 F.3d 1157, 1164 (7th
 401 Cir. 1997). District courts have largely come down on the side of the Seventh Circuit in holding
 402 that the one-year limitations period in § 2614 is subject to equitable tolling. See, e.g., *Kerby v.*
 403 *Mortgage Funding Corp.*, 992 F.Supp. 787, 791-98 (D.Md.1998); *Moll v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.*,
 404 700 F.Supp. 1284, 1286-89 (S.D.N.Y.1988). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit, as noted above, has
 405 interpreted the TILA limitations period in 15 U.S.C. § 1640 as subject to equitable tolling; the
 406 language of the two provisions is nearly identical. *King v. California*, 784 F.2d at 914. While not
 407 of precedential value, this Court has previously found both the TILA and RESPA limitations
 408 periods to be subject to equitable tolling. *Blaylock v. First American Title Ins. Co.*, 504
 409 F.Supp.2d 1091, (W.D. Wash. 2007). 1106-07.

410 The Ninth Circuit has explained that the doctrine of equitable tolling "focuses on excusable delay
 411 by the Petitioner," and inquires whether "a reasonable Petitioner would ... have known of the
 412 existence of a possible claim within the limitations period." *Johnson v. Henderson*, 314 F.3d
 413 409, 414 (9th Cir.2002), *Santa Maria v. Pacific Bell*, 202 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir.2000).
 414 Equitable tolling focuses on the reasonableness of the Petitioner's delay and does not depend on
 415 any wrongful conduct by the Defendants. *Santa Maria*. at 1178.

416 **BUSINESS PRACTICES CONCERNING DISREGARDING OF UNDERWRITING
 417 STANDARDS**

418 Traditionally, Lenders required borrowers seeking mortgage loans to document their income and
 419 assets by, for example, providing W-2 statements, tax returns, bank statements, documents
 420 evidencing title, employment information, and other information and documentation that could
 421 be analyzed and investigated for its truthfulness, accuracy, and to determine the borrower's
 422 ability to repay a particular loan over both the short and long term. Defendants deviated from and
 423 disregarded these standards, particularly with regard to its riskier and more profitable loan
 424 products.

425 **Low-Documentation/No-Documentation Loans.**

426 Driven by its desire for market share and a perceived need to maintain competitiveness with the
 427 likes of Countrywide, Defendants began to introduce an ever increasing variety of low and no
 428 documentation loan products, including the HARMs and HELOCs described hereinabove, and
 429 began to deviate from and ease its underwriting criteria, and then to grant liberal exceptions to
 ORIGINAL PETITION

430 the already eased underwriting standards to the point of disregarding such standards. This
431 quickened the loan origination process, allowing for the generation of more and more loans
432 which could then be resold and/or securitized in the secondary market.

433 Defendants marketed no-documentation/low-documentation loan programs that included
434 HARMs and HELOCs, among others, in which loans were given based on the borrower's "stated
435 income" or "stated assets" (SISA) neither of which were verified. Employment was verbally
436 confirmed, if at all, but not further investigated, and income, if it was even considered as a factor,
437 was to be roughly consistent with incomes in the types of jobs in which the borrower was
438 employed. When borrowers were requested to document their income, they were able to do so
439 through information that was less reliable than in a full-documentation loan.

440 For stated income loans, it became standard practice for loan processors, loan officers and
441 underwriters to rely on www.salary.com to see if a stated income was reasonable. Such stated
442 income loans, emphasizing loan origination from a profitability standpoint at the expense of
443 determining the ability of the borrower to repay the loan from an underwriting standpoint,
444 encouraged the overstating and/or fabrication of income.

445 **Easing of Underwriting Standards**

446 In order to produce more loans that could be resold in the secondary mortgage market,
447 Defendants also relaxed, and often disregarded, traditional underwriting standards used to
448 separate acceptable from unacceptable risk. Examples of such relaxed standards were reducing
449 the base FICO score needed for a SISA loan.

450 Other underwriting standards that Defendants relaxed included qualifying interest rates (the rate
451 used to determine whether borrowers can afford the loan), loan to value ratios (the amount of
452 loan(s) compared to the appraised/sale price of the property, whichever is lower), and debt-to-
453 income ratios (the amount of monthly income compared to monthly debt service payments and
454 other monthly payment obligations).

455 With respect to HARMs, Defendants underwrote loans without regard to the borrower's long-
456 term financial circumstances, approving the loan based on the initial fixed rate without taking
457 into account whether the borrower could afford the substantially higher payment that would
458 inevitably be required during the remaining term of the loan.

459 With respect to HELOCs, Defendants underwrote and approved such loans based only on the
460 borrower's ability to afford the interest-only payment during the initial draw period of the loan,
461 rather than on the borrower's ability to afford the subsequent, fully amortized principal and
462 interest payments.

463 As Defendants pushed to expand market share, they eased other basic underwriting standards.
464 For example, higher loan-to-value (LTV) and combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios were
465 allowed. Likewise, higher debt-to-income (DTI) ratios were allowed. At the same time that they
466 eased underwriting standards the Defendants also were encouraging consumers to go further into
467 debt in order to supply the very lucrative aftermarket of mortgage backed securities. The relaxed
468 underwriting standards created the aftermarket supply they needed. As a result, the Defendants
469 made it easy for the unwary consumer to take on more debt than he could afford by encouraging
470 unsound financial practices, all the while knowing defaults would occur more and more
471 frequently as the credit ratios of citizens reached the limit of the new relaxed underwriting
472 standards.

473 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, from its own
474 underwriting guidelines industry standards that it was accumulating and selling/reselling risky
475 loans that were likely to end up in default. However, as the pressure mounted to increase market
476 share and originate more loans, Defendants began to grant "exceptions" even to its relaxed
477 underwriting guidelines. Such was the environment that loan officers and underwriters were,
478 from time to time, placed in the position of having to justify why they did not approve a loan that
479 failed to meet underwriting criteria.

480 **Risk Layering**

481 Defendants compromised its underwriting even further by risk layering, i.e. combining high risk
482 loans with one or more relaxed underwriting standards.

483 Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that layered risk
484 would increase the likelihood of default. Among the risk layering Defendants engaged in were
485 approving HARM loans with little to no down payment, little to no documentation, and high
486 DTI/LTV/CLTV ratios. Despite such knowledge, Defendants combined these very risk factors in
487 the loans it promoted to borrowers.

488 Loan officers and mortgage Agents aided and abetted this scheme by working closely with other
489 mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers to increase loan originations, knowing or having reason to
490 believe that Defendants and other mortgage Lenders/mortgage bankers with whom they did
491 business ignored basic established underwriting standards and acted to mislead the borrower, all
492 to the detriment of the borrower and the consumer of loan products..

493 Petitioner is informed and believe, and on that basis allege, that Defendants, and each of them,
494 engaged and/or actively participated in, authorized, ratified, or had knowledge of, all of the
495 business practices described above in paragraphs 30-42 of this Complaint

496 ***UNJUST ENRICHMENT***

497 Petitioner is informed and believes that each and all of the Defendants received a benefit at
498 Petitioner's expense, including but not limited to the following: To the Agent, commissions,
499 yield spread premiums, spurious fees and charges, and other "back end" payments in amounts to
500 be proved at trial; To the originating Lender, commissions, incentive bonuses, resale premiums,
501 surcharges and other "back end" payments in amounts to be proved at trial; To the investors,
502 resale premiums, and high rates of return; To the servicers including EMS, servicing fees,
503 percentages of payment proceeds, charges, and other "back end" payments in amounts to be
504 proved at trial; To all participants, the expectation of future revenues from charges, penalties and
505 fees paid by Petitioner when the unaffordable LOAN was foreclosed or refinanced.

506 By their misrepresentations, omissions and other wrongful acts alleged heretofore, Defendants,
507 and each of them, were unjustly enriched at the expense of Petitioner, and Petitioner was unjustly
508 deprived, and is entitled to restitution in the amount of \$973,346.12

509 ***CLAIM TO QUIET TITLE.***

510 Petitioner properly averred a claim to quiet title. Petitioner included both the street address, and
511 the Assessor's Parcel Number for the property. Petitioner has set forth facts concerning the title
512 interests of the subject property. Moreover, as shown above, Petitioner's claims for rescission
513 and fraud are meritorious. As such, Petitioner's bases for quiet title are meritorious as well.

514 Defendants have no title, estate, lien, or interest in the Subject Property in that the purported
515 power of sale contained in the Deed of Trust is of no force or effect because Defendants' security
516 interest in the Subject Property has been rendered void and that the Defendants are not the holder

517 in due course of the Promissory Note. Moreover, because Petitioner properly pled all Defendants'
 518 involvement in a fraudulent scheme, all Defendants are liable for the acts of its co-conspirators,

519 "a Petitioner is entitled to damages from those Defendants who concur in the tortuous
 520 scheme with knowledge of its unlawful purpose." *Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co.*, 24 Cal.
 521 3d 773, 157 Cal. Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45 (1979); *Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc.*
 522 v. *Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc.*, 143 Cal. App. 4th 1284, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d
 523 27 (1st Dist. 2006); *Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp.*, 40 Cal. App. 4th 1571, 47 Cal.
 524 Rptr. 2d 752 (2d Dist. 1995).

525 **SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADING**

526 Petitioner has sufficiently pled that relief can be granted on each and every one of the
 527 Complaint's causes of action. A complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond
 528 doubt that the Petitioner can prove no set of facts in support of Petitioner claim which would
 529 entitle Petitioner to relief." *Housley v. U.S. (9th Cir. Nev. 1994)* 35 F.3d 400, 401. "All
 530 allegations of material fact in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light most
 531 favorable to Petitioner." *Argabright v. United States*, 35 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996).

532 Attendant, the Complaint includes a "short, plain statement, of the basis for relief." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
 533 8(a). The Complaint contains cognizable legal theories, sufficient facts to support cognizable legal
 534 theories, and seeks remedies to which Petitioner is entitled. *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d
 535 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); *King v. California*, 784 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1986). Moreover, the legal
 536 conclusions in the Complaint can and should be drawn from the facts alleged, and, in turn, the court
 537 should accept them as such. *Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network*, 18 F.3d 752 (9th Cir, 1994). Lastly,
 538 Petitioner's complaint contains claims and has a probable validity of proving a "set of facts" in support of
 539 their claim entitling them to relief. *Housley v. U.S. (9th Cir. Nev. 1994)* 35 F.3d 400, 401. Therefore,
 540 relief as requested herein should be granted.

541 **CAUSES OF ACTION**

542 **BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY**

543 Defendants Agent, appraiser, trustee, Lender, et al, and each of them, owed Petitioner a fiduciary
 544 duty of care with respect to the mortgage loan transactions and related title activities involving
 545 the Trust Property.

546 Defendants breached their duties to Petitioner by, *inter alia*, the conduct described above. Such
547 breaches included, but were not limited to, ensuring their own and Petitioners' compliance with
548 all applicable laws governing the loan transactions in which they were involved, including but
549 not limited to, TILA, HOEPA, RESPA and the Regulations X and Z promulgated there under.

550 Defendant's breaches of said duties were a direct and proximate cause of economic and non-
551 economic harm and detriment to Petitioner(s).

552 Petitioner did suffer economic, non-economic harm, and detriment as a result of such conduct,
553 all to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

554 ***CAUSE OF ACTION - NEGLIGENCE/NEGLIGENCE PER SE***

555 Defendants owed a general duty of care with respect to Petitioners, particularly concerning their
556 duty to properly perform due diligence as to the loans and related transactional issues described
557 hereinabove.

558 In addition, Defendants owed a duty of care under TILA, HOEPA, RESPA and the Regulations
559 X and Z promulgated there under to, among other things, provide proper disclosures concerning
560 the terms and conditions of the loans they marketed, to refrain from marketing loans they knew
561 or should have known that borrowers could not afford or maintain, and to avoid paying undue
562 compensation such as "yield spread premiums" to mortgage Agents and loan officers.

563 Defendants knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the loan
564 transactions involving Petitioner and other persons similarly situated were defective, unlawful,
565 violative of federal and state laws and regulations, and would subject Petitioner to economic and
566 non-economic harm and other detriment.

567 Petitioner is among the class of persons that TILA, HOEPA, RESPA and the Regulations X and
568 Z promulgated there under were intended and designed to protect, and the conduct alleged
569 against Defendants is the type of conduct and harm which the referenced statutes and regulations
570 were designed to deter.

571 As a direct and proximate result of Defendant's negligence, Petitioner suffered economic and
572 non-economic harm in an amount to be shown according to proof at trial.

573 **AGENT: COMMON LAW FRAUD**

574 If any Agents' misrepresentations made herein were not intentional, said misrepresentations were
575 negligent. When the Agents made the representations alleged herein, he/she/it had no reasonable
576 ground for believing them to be true.

577 Agents made these representations with the intention of inducing Petitioner to act in reliance on
578 these representations in the manner hereafter alleged, or with the expectation that Petitioner
579 would so act.

580 Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent et al, facilitated, aided and abetted various Agents
581 in their negligent misrepresentation, and that various Agents were negligent in not implementing
582 procedures such as underwriting standards oversight that would have prevented various Agents
583 from facilitating the irresponsible and wrongful misrepresentations of various Agents to
584 Defendants.

585 Petitioner is informed and believes that Agent acted in concert and collusion with others named
586 herein in promulgating false representations to cause Petitioner to enter into the LOAN without
587 knowledge or understanding of the terms thereof.

588 As a proximate result of the negligent misrepresentations of Agents as herein alleged, the
589 Petitioner sustained damages, including monetary loss, emotional distress, loss of credit, loss of
590 opportunities, attorney fees and costs, and other damages to be determined at trial. As a
591 proximate result of Agents' breach of duty and all other actions as alleged herein, Plaintiff has
592 suffered severe emotional distress, mental anguish, harm, humiliation, embarrassment, and
593 mental and physical pain and anguish, all to Petitioner's damage in an amount to be established
594 at trial.

595 **PETITIONER PROPERLY AVERRED A CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
596 COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING.**

597 Petitioner properly pled Defendants violated the breach of implied covenant of good faith and
598 fair dealing. "Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its
599 performance and its enforcement." *Price v. Wells Fargo Bank*, 213 Cal.App.3d 465, 478, 261
600 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1989); Rest.2d Contracts § 205. A mortgage Agent has fiduciary duties. *Wyatt v.*

601 Union Mortgage Co., (1979) 24 Cal. 3d. 773. Further, In *Jonathan Neil & Associates, Inc. v.*
 602 *Jones*, (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 917, the court stated:

603 In the area of insurance contracts the covenant of good faith and fair dealing has taken on a
 604 particular significance, in part because of the special relationship between the insurer and the
 605 insured. The insurer, when determining whether to settle a claim, must give at least as much
 606 consideration to the welfare of its insured as it gives to its own interests. . . The standard is
 607 premised on the insurer's obligation to protect the insured's interests . . . *Id. at 937.*

608 Likewise, there is a special relationship between an Agent and borrower. "A person who
 609 provides Agency services to a borrower in a covered loan transaction by soliciting Lenders or
 610 otherwise negotiating a consumer loan secured by real property, is the fiduciary of the
 611 consumer...this fiduciary duty [is owed] to the consumer regardless of whom else the Agent may
 612 be acting as an Agent for . . . The fiduciary duty of the Agent is to deal with the consumer in
 613 *good faith*. If the *Agent knew or should have known that the Borrower will or has a likelihood of*
 614 *defaulting ... they have a fiduciary duty to the borrower not to place them in that loan.*"
 615 (California Department of Real Estate, *Section 8: Fiduciary Responsibility*, www.dre.ca.gov).
 616 [*Emphasis Added*].

617 All Defendants, willfully breached their implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with
 618 Petitioner when Defendants: (1) Failed to provide all of the proper disclosures; (2) Failed to
 619 provide accurate Right to Cancel Notices; (3) Placed Petitioner into Petitioner's current loan
 620 product without regard for other more affordable products; (4) Placed Petitioner into a loan
 621 without following proper underwriting standards; (5) Failed to disclose to Petitioner that
 622 Petitioner was going to default because of the loan being unaffordable; (6) Failed to perform
 623 valid and /or properly documented substitutions and assignments so that Petitioner could
 624 ascertain Petitioner rights and duties; and (7) Failed to respond in good faith to Petitioner's
 625 request for documentation of the servicing of Petitioner's loan and the existence and content of
 626 relevant documents. Additionally, Defendants breached their implied covenant of good faith and
 627 fair dealing with Petitioner when Defendants initiated foreclosure proceedings even without the
 628 right under an alleged power of sale because the purported assignment was not recorded and by
 629 willfully and knowingly financially profiting from their malfeasance. Therefore, due to the
 630 special relationship inherent in a real estate transaction between Agent and borrower, *and* all
 631 Defendants' participation in the conspiracy, the Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

632 ***CAUSE OF ACTION VIOLATION OF TRUTH IN LENDING ACT 15 U.S.C. §1601 ET***

633 ***SEQ***

634 Petitioner hereby incorporates by reference, re-pleads and re-alleges each and every allegation
635 contained in all of the paragraphs of the General Allegations and Facts Common to All Causes of
636 Action as though the same were set forth herein.

637 Petitioner is informed and believes that Defendant's violation of the provisions of law rendered
638 the credit transaction null and void, invalidates Defendant's claimed interest in the Subject
639 Property, and entitles Petitioner to damages as proven at trial.

640 ***INTENTIONAL INFILCTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS***

641 The conduct committed by Defendants, driven as it was by profit at the expense of increasingly
642 highly leveraged and vulnerable consumers who placed their faith and trust in the superior
643 knowledge and position of Defendants, was extreme and outrageous and not to be tolerated by
644 civilized society.

645 Defendants either knew that their conduct would cause Petitioner to suffer severe emotional
646 distress, or acted in conscious and/or reckless disregard of the probability that such distress
647 would occur.

648 Petitioner did in fact suffer severe emotional distress as an actual and proximate result of the
649 conduct of Defendants as described hereinabove.

650 As a result of such severe emotional distress, Petitioner suffered economic and non economic
651 harm and detriment, all to be shown according to proof at trial of this matter.

652 Petitioner demands that Defendants provide Petitioner with release of lien on the lien signed by
653 Petitioner and secure to Petitioner quite title;

654 Petitioner demands Defendants disgorge themselves of all enrichment received from Petitioner
655 as payments to Defendants based on the fraudulently secured promissory note in an amount to be
656 calculated by Defendants and verified to Petitioner;

657 Petitioner further demands that Defendants pay to Petitioner an amount equal to treble the
658 amount Defendants intended to defraud Petitioner of which amount Petitioner calculated to be
659 equal to \$2,920,038.36

PRAYER

661 WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for judgment against the named Defendants, and each of them,
662 as follows:

663 For an emergency restraining order enjoining lender and any successor in interest from
664 foreclosing on Petitioner's Property pending adjudication of Petitioner's claims set forth
665 herein;

666 For a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from engaging in the fraudulent,
667 deceptive, predatory and negligent acts and practices alleged herein;

668 For quiet title to Property;

For rescission of the loan contract and restitution by Defendants to Petitioner according to proof at trial;

For disgorgement of all amounts wrongfully acquired by Defendants according to proof at trial;

673 For actual monetary damages in the amount \$973,346.12;

For pain and suffering due to extreme mental anguish in an amount to be determined at trial.

676 For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest according to proof at trial;

677 For punitive damages according to proof at trial in an amount equal to \$2,920,038.36.


678 For attorney's fees and costs as provided by statute; and,

679 For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

680 Respectfully Submitted,

Ursula Schanne Gerard H Moore
Ursula Schanne Gerard H Moore

695 Ursula Schanne, *pro se*
696 Gerard H Moore, *pro se*
697 16503 Reichel Rd SE
698 Rainier, Washington 98576
699 (360) 446-2121
700 xercies@aol.com
701



702 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
703 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON STATE
704

Ursula Schanne, *pro se*
Gerard H Moore, *pro se*

Plaintiff,

Case # _____

ORIGINAL PETITION

vs.

Nationstar Mortgage LLC

Defendant

Date: October 14th 2010

705
706
707 **PLAINTIFF'S DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL**

708

709 Plaintiff, Ursula Schanne Gerard H Moore asserts his rights under the Seventh
710 Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and demands, in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil
711 Procedure 38, a trial by jury on all issues.

712 Respectfully Submitted,

713

714

715

716

Ursula Schanne *Gerard H Moore*

Ursula Schanne Gerard H Moore